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CONGRESSIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF JURISDICTION
FROM FEDERAL COURTS: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR
UDDO
Michael Vitiello*

INTRODUCTION
Article III of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power to create federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court.'
Although the subject of some debate, 2 it is now well settled that as
a corollary to its power to create federal courts, Congress may determine the jurisdiction of those courts.' Over the past thirty
years, numerous bills that would eliminate the jurisdiction of some
or all federal courts over a particular class of cases have been introduced in Congress but have not been enacted.' Currently, critics of
various federal court decisions have again sought to limit federal
court jurisdiction as an alternative to the constitutional amendment process.'
One such bill is the Helms-Hyde Human Life Bill," the subject
of recent testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Separation
of Powers by Professor Basile Uddo published as an article in this
law review. 7 The Bill does two things: section 1 provides that "ac* Mr. Vitiello is an Associate Professor of Law at Loyola University School of Law. He

holds the B.A. from Swarthmore College, the J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, and
is a member of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey bars.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time

ordain and establish."
2. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
3.

OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

§ 10 (3d ed. 1976).

See infra note 17.

4. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTzM 360

H. WECHSLER, HAR Am WECHsLER's THE
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HAr &

WECHSLER].

5. An Introduction, 65 JUDICATURE 177 (1981); see also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 158, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1981) (prepared statement by Senator Moynihan) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
6. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Seass. (1981).
7. Uddo, The Human Life Bill: Protecting the Unborn Through CongressionalEnforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 Lov. L. Rzv. 1079 (1981).
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tual human life exists from conception." 8 In Roe v. Wade,' the Supreme Court deemed itself unable to determine When life begins.
Proponents of the Human Life Bill believe that the Supreme Court
will defer to Congress' determination of that fact, 10 thus extending
constitutional protection of liberty to the fetus. In substance, the
Bill would require the Court to overrule Roe."
On its face section 2 of the Bill does not directly limit a woman's right to an abortion. It provides that no inferior article III
court "shall have jurisdiction to issue any restrainiig order, temporary or permanent injunction, or declaratory judgment" in any case
involving state or local laws limiting the right to an abortion."2 Section 2 was born out of concern that lower federal courts were "hos-

tile to any legislation that touches upon abortion.'" The effect of
8. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1981).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. Uddo, supra note 7.
11. Not all participants in the abortion debate agree that the necessary effect of the
Human Life Bill is to require the Court to overrule Roe. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at
429-30 (testimony of Professor Nagel): "I should add that. . .I do not think that the bill by
its own force, reverses Roe v. Wade . . . I do think it might bear on the Court's reassessment of that decision in light of the different legal issues before it." But numerous proponents and opponents of the bill believe that it would have that effect. See, e.g., Hearings, id.
at 2 (statement of Senator East):
What would I think the practical effect of it would be? I would presume it would
be this: The Roe v. Wade decision of 1973 would be vitiated-negated-because in
the majority opinion of that case it was indicated that if person included the unborn,
that their decision would no longer be operative, and hence, if person is so defined, by
the view of the Court in its own majority opinion, Roe v. Wade would be vitiated.
Hearings, id. at 155 (statement of Senator Packwood):
Congressman Mazzoli, a chairman of the prolife caucus, says it very well in his
testimony which will soon follow when he says: "In essence, the caucus supports the
enactment of the Right to Life Act as an interim step until a Human Life Amendment is adopted." Congressman Hyde has said essentially the same thing: S. 158 will
ban abortions.
Hearings, Id. at 160 (prepared statement of Senator Moynihan):
This leads to the central question raised by the Human Life Statute. It is within
Congress's constitutionally-prescribed power to declare that a fetus is a person after
the Supreme Court has declared that it is not? In other words, can an Act of Congress overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution? I believe the
answer is, unequivocally, that it is not.
Letter from Professor Kurland to Senator Baucus (Apr. 17, 1981), reprinted in Hearings, id.
at 193: "The Supreme Court has decided that a fetus is not a 'person' in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If that constitutional determination is to
be overruled, it can be done only by the Supreme Court or by constitutional amendment."
12. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1981).
13. Uddo, supra note 7, at 1082. See also Uddo, A Wink From the Bench: The Federal Courts and Abortion, 53 TUL. L. REv. 398 (1979) [hereinafter cited as A Wink From the
Bench].
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section 2 is to remit to state courts the initial determination of the
constitutionality of any bills involving abortion.
Professor Uddo states that "[v]ery little need be said about
[section 2] because it is beyond debate that this provision is constitutional."" I do not share Professor Uddo's enthusiasm for section
2 of the Human Life Bill. First, there is an active debate over the
very question that Professor Uddo considers settled. Second, there
are prudential reasons why one should resist tampering with federal court jurisdiction, no matter how one views the substantive
rights declared by federal courts. This article examines the extent
of Congress' power to withdraw jurisdiction from the lower federal
courts and concludes that there is no precedent to support such a
withdrawal, the linchpin of section 2 of the Human Life Bill.
THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE
Article III leaves to Congress the creation of federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court." Congress established such courts in
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the seminal legislation affecting the federal judiciary." Most commentators assume that Congress may
abolish all inferior federal courts.17 As a corollary of that assumption, it has been argued that Congress "a fortiori, can exercise the
lesser power of restricting or removing certain parts of their jurisdiction."18 There is ample support for this view in Supreme Court
decisions." Despite some limited authority to the contrary,'0 one
commentator concludes that "[n]early two centuries of history
stand in the way of those who would claim that Congress must vest
the entire judicial power [in federal courts]."
It is one thing to conclude that Congress has broad power over
14. Uddo, supra note 7, at 1081.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
16. Judiciary Act of 1979, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
CIAL

17. See, e.g., M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDIPOWER 21 (1980). Even this proposition is not beyond debate. See Eisenberg, Congres-

sional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALx L.J. 498 (1974).
18. A Wink From the Bench, supra note 13, at 402. See also M. REDISH, supra note
17, at 21 and C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, §§ 8, 10.
19.

See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner &

Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
20. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816) (dictum by Justice
Story that article III required Congress to vest all federal judicial power in some federal
court); see also Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
21. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 29.
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federal court jurisdiction; it is another to conclude that congressional power is unfettered. Undoubtedly, most supporters of jurisdiction-withdrawal statutes would recognize that other constitutional provisions impose some limitations on congressional efforts
to shape jurisdiction. As the authors of one treatise on constitutional law hypothesize, "[S]ince the equal protection guarantee of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids racial discrimination, Congress could not enact a statute totally denying
original or appellate jurisdiction over actions brought by members
of a particular racial group, for that result would amount to a violation of due process. '"" Similarly, it is doubtful that Congress can
withdraw from all courts, including state courts and the Supreme
Court, the power to hear a case involving a particular constitutional right. For example, in 1947, in section 2(d) of the Portal-toPortal Act,23 Congress attempted to prevent all judicial review of
an employee's claim for minimum wages or overtime conpensation
contrary to substantive provisions of the Act. While upholding
those substantive provisions, the Second Circuit rejected Congress'
denial of jurisdiction: "We think, however, that the exercise by
Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance
'
with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment."24
Whether section 2 of the Human Life Bill would be subject to
a similar constitutional challenge is open to debate, but it is this
author's view that section 2 will not have the intended effect of
preventing federal courts from deciding constitutional challenges
to state anti-abortiQn laws. Section 1 is intended to allow states to
legislate against abortion. 25 Unquestionably, a number of states
would do so. At that point, pro-choice proponents would seek a
judicial declaration on the constitutionality of any state legislation
22. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 44 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. See also Taylor, The Unconstitutionality of
Current Legislative Proposals, 65 JUDICATURE 199, 201 (1981): "To say that congressional
power over federal court jurisdiction is 'plenary' does not mean that it is immune from the

general limitations on congressional power found elsewhere in the Constitution ..
" Article III must, of course, be read as limited by amendments which followed its adoption. M.
REDISH, supra note 17, at 25.

23. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 2(d), 29 U.S.C. § 252(d) (1976).
24. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 887 (1948). See also Oestereich v. Selective Service Sys., 393 U.S. 233 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring); M. REDISH, supra note 17, at 28; D. CURRIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 145-48 (2d ed. 1975).

25. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1981); see also Hearings,supra note 5, at 169-70
(prepared statement of Representatives Mazzoli and Doughtery).
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touching on the subject of abortion. Because of federal court sympathy,"e proponents would select a federal forum to challenge state
legislation as in violation of Roe. Once a case was before the federal court, it would have to decide the jurisdictional question."
The plaintiff would properly invoke jurisdiction under section
1331,28 the general federal question statute, to challenge the constitutionality of section 2 of the Human Life Bill. As asserted by one
constitutional scholar, "[i]t is simply not true that Congress can
remove a federal court's jurisdiction free of constitutional scrutiny
...
[For example], unless Congress repeals the general federal
jurisdictional statute, a federal court has jurisdiction under that
statute to review the constitutionality of any more specific
jurisdictional

limitation."29

Thus,

the

courts

from

which

section 2 withdraws jurisdiction would properly construe its
constitutionality.
Once in federal court, plaintiff would argue that section 2 violates a woman's right to due process and equal protection. There is
substantial support for that view. For example, in connection with
the Senate hearings on the Human Life Bill, a letter joined in by
twelve leading constitutional law scholars and six former United
States Attorneys General to the Committee stated:
Our views about the correctness of the Supreme Court's 1973 abortion decision vary widely, but all of us are agreed that Congress has
no constitutional authority either to overturn that decision by enacting a statute redefining such terms as 'person' or 'human life,' or
selectively to restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts so as to prevent them from enforcing that decision fully. We thus regard S. 158
and H.R. 900 as an attempt to exercise unconstitutional power and a
dangerous circumvention of the avenues that the Constitution itself
provides for reversing Supreme Court interpretations."
In a recent issue of Judicature devoted to the subject of with26. A Wink From the Bench, supra note 13, at 399.
27. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 7.
28.
29.
30.

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 37-38 (1978).
Hearings, supra note 5, at 248. The twelve professors were Paul Brest, John Hart

Ely, Paul A. Freund, Erwin N. Griswold, Louis Henkin, Philip B. Kurland, Louis B.
Schwartz, Laurence Tribe, Telford Taylor, William Van Alstyne, Harry H. Wellington, and
Charles Alan Wright. The six Attorneys General (and their terms of office) were Herbert
Brownell, Jr. (1953-1957); Nicholas Katzenbach (1965-1966); Ramsey Clark (1967-1968); Elliot L. Richardson (1973); William B. Saxbe (1973-1974); Benjamin R. Civiletti (1979-1981).
See also Letter from Erwin N. Griswold (May 5, 1981), reprintedin Hearings,id. at 192-93;
Hearings, id at 344-46 (prepared statement of Professor Archibald Cox).
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drawal of federal court jurisdiction, Professor Taylor developed the
due process argument specifically as applied to the Human Life
Bill. 1 The argument advanced is basically that although section 2
of the Human Life Bill is phrased in jurisdictional language, its
purpose and effect are substantive m2 -_it is intended "to make it
more difficult for individuals to secure their constitutional rights
recognized in Roe v. Wade.""
Taylor contends that there is some precedent concerning Congress' authority to use jurisdictional statutes to impair federally
guaranteed rights. Although not on all fours, United States v.
Klein3 4 poses problems for proponents of section 2 of the Human
Life Bill. In Klein the plaintiff sued the United States to recover
the proceeds from the sale of cotton which the government had
seized during the Civil War. A statute in effect at the time of the
seizure" "provided that any person claiming to have been the owner of [seized] property might prefer his claim to the proceeds
thereof, and, on proof that he had never given aid or comfort to
the rebellion, receive the amount after deducting expenses."" The.
Court had previously held in United States v. Padleford7 that the
grant of a pardon constituted proof that the recipient "had never
given voluntary aid or comfort" to the enemy. Based on proof of a
pardon, Klein prevailed against the government in the Court of
Claims. While the case was on appeal, Congress enacted a statute
that
declares in substance that no pardon ...shall be admissible in evidence in support of any claim against the United States in the Court
of Claims, or to establish the right of any claimant to bring suit in
that court; nor, if already put in evidence, shall be used or considered on behalf of the claimant, by said court, or by the appellate
court on appeal.88
The Act further provided that the proof of a pardon was to have
the opposite effect of that declared in Padleford, i.e., that proof of
a pardon was conclusive evidence that the recipient had given aid
to the rebellion. Once evidence of the pardon was introduced, the
31.

Taylor, supra note 22.

32.

See A Wink From the Bench, supra note 13, at 460-64.

33. Taylor, supra note 22, at 202.
34. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
35. Captured and Abandoned Property Act of March 12, 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820.
36.

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 139.

37.

76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).

38.

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 143.
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court lost jurisdiction to hear the case.

9

Congress went further in the Act of 1870 than it would in
adopting the Human Life Bill, in that the earlier enactment denied
jurisdiction both to the Court of Claims and to the Supreme
Court. 40 But Klein indicates that the Court can consider the in-

tended effect of a jurisdiction-modifying statute:
Undoubtedly the Legislature has complete control over the organization and existence of that court and may confer or withhold the
right of appeal from its decisions. And if this act did nothing more,
it would be our duty to give it effect. If it simply denied the right of
appeal in a particular class of cases, there could be no doubt that it
must be regarded as an exercise of the power of Congress to make
"such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction" as should seem to
it expedient.
But the language of the provisio shows plainly that it does not
intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an
end. Its great and controlling purpose is to deny to pardons granted
by the President the effect which this court had adjudged them to
have.
We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit
which separates the legislative from the judicial power.
The rule prescribed is also liable to just exception as impairing
the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional power
of the Executive.41
Professor Taylor reads Klein broadly and concludes that "just
as the purpose and effect of the 1870 statute was substantive-i.e.,

to nullify the effect of a presidential pardon on war property
claims-so the purpose and effect of section 2 of H.R. 900 is substantive. . . . In neither case is the purpose constitutionally per39. Id. at 144-45.
40. Attempting to withdraw jurisdiction from the Supreme Court raises other issues,
such as potential disruption of the constitutional scheme of checks and balances. Most
scholars believe that Congress may not alter Supreme Court jurisdiction in order to frustrate substantive constitutional rights. See, e.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); L.
TRIBE, supra note 29, at 37-38; M. REDISH, supra note 17, at 16-34; Eisenberg, supra note
17, at 518-32; D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL (1976), cited in R. FORRESTER & J. MOYE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 15-17
(3d ed.). But see Rice, The Constitutional Basis for the Proposals in Congress Today, 65
JUDICATURE 190 (1981).
41. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145-47 (emphasis added).
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missible."' 2 Professor Taylor anticipates the objection that the
Court will not inquire into legislative motive to determine the constitutionality of a statute."' He cites well-recognized exceptions
where the Court will inquire into motive; for example, "the Court
has held that a statute which does not on its face articulate an
unlawful purpose, may, because of its language and the context in
which it is enacted, disclose on its face an unlawful purpose and an
inevitable unlawful effect.""' Professor Taylor finds it "inescapable, on the face of the bill, that its only purpose and its inevitable effect are to obstruct the judicial protection of the constitutional rights recognized in Roe v.Wade.'4 Finding no compelling
governmental interest in doing so, ' he concludes that the Bill is
7
unconstitutional.'
A critic of Taylor's analysis may respond that section 1 of the
Human Life Bill is constitutional, and, therefore, section 2 is not
obstructing a constitutional right. That, too, is far from clear."
The Supreme Court's eventual decision on section 1 would not be
known if the challenge to the Human Life Bill were made initially
in a federal declaratory judgment action. The district court could
take jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of section 2 under
the general federal question statute. 9 Presumably, to decide the
validity of the withdrawl of jurisdiction, the court would have to
address the constitutionality of section 1, for if section 1 violates a
woman's constitutional right to an abortion, Congress cannot manipulate jurisdiction to destroy that right. Both sections 1 and 2
present substantial federal questions, the determinant of federal
42.

Taylor, supra note 22, at 202. See also Meserve, Limiting Jurisdictionand Reme-

dies of Federal Courts, 68 A.B.A. J. 159 (1982).
43. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968).
44. Taylor, supra note 22, at 202 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 29, at
591-98.
45. Taylor, supra note 22, at 204.
46. By contrast, Congress acts permissibly when it modifies jurisdiction to relieve
court congestion.
47. Taylor, supra note 22, at 204. Professor Taylor contends that H.R. 900 also violates the equal protection clause: "[T]he jurisdictional withdrawal in Section 2 singles out

pregnant women... as a group subjected to a denial of access to the federal courts. There
is no conceivable state interest which warrants subjecting them to deprivation of access to
the federal courts equal to that enjoyed by those seeking to protect comparable constitutional rights." Id.

48. See, e.g., supra note 30.
49.

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
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court jurisdiction.' 0 Thus, the Human Life Bill will not succeed in
avoiding district court review.
The argument that Congress cannot defeat judicial declarations of constitutional rights (especially if unpopular) by manipulation of jurisdiction is bolstered by the amendment process provided for in article V of the Constitution. 1 It is incongruous to
allow a majority of Congress to skirt the arduous amendment process through the expedient of withdrawing jurisdiction. Because
the Human Life Bill does not withdraw jurisdiction from the Supreme Court, it does not have impact as broad as an amendment.
But the sponsors of the Bill are inviting state legislatures to alter
the right to an abortion, even if short of a complete repudiation of
the right, without interference from the federal district courts and
courts of appeal.' 2
RELEVANT PRECEDENT
Up to this point I have addressed the primary argument
against the constitutionality of section 2. It remains to discuss the
judicial authority relied on by supporters of the Bill."
50. See Hart, supra note 40, at 1387; but see M. RaDIsH, supra note 17, at 26.
51. See Kay, The Unforeseen Impact on Courts and Congress, 65 JuDicATURE 185, 189
(1981).
52. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 328 (prepared statement of Professor Archibald
Cox): The Human Life Bill "attempts to overrule the Supreme Court decision in Roe v.
Wade by a simple legislative majority." See also Hearings,id. at 162 (prepared statement of
Senator Moynihan):
There are many instances of Congressional disagreement with a Supreme Court
decision. As a member of the Senate Finance Committee, the one I know best is Congressional reaction to an 1895 decision that found the federal income tax law of 1894
unconstitutional (Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429). Records of
the period show that several Congressmen considered legislation to overturn the
Court's decision that a direct income tax violated the Constitution. Despite the
strongest of feelings, Congress ultimately decided that the only responsible way
-indeed, the only permissible way-to overturn the Court's decision was to amend
the Constitution. Only with passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, some twenty years
later, did an income tax become constitutional.
The amendment process is lengthy. It is cumbersome. Its outcome, as we have
seen with the Equal Rights Amendment, is far from guaranteed. But it is the only one
legitimately available to us. To proceed in any other way to change a Supreme Court
interpretation of the Constitution is to undermine the Constitution.
53. See Uddo, supra note 7, at 1081-83; A Wink From the Bench, supra note 13, at
402-08; Hearings,supra note 5, at 235 (written statement of Attorney Stephen H. Galebach
re: The Constitutionality of Withdrawal of Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction in the Human
Life Bill).
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Sheldon v. Sill5 ' contains broad language concerning the

power of Congress to determine the jurisdiction of federal courts
inferior to the Supreme Court:
[I]t would seem to follow.

. .

that, having a right to prescribe, Con-

gress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any
of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have
no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers. No one of them can
assert a just claim to jurisdiction exclusively conferred on another or
withheld from all. 5
Professor Uddo cites similarly broad language from Palmore v.
United States:"
The decision with respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the
task of defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of Congress. That body was not constitutionally required to create inferior
Art. III courts. .

.

.Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was

it required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized
to bestow under Article III."
In neither case, however, had Congress attempted the particularized withdrawal of jurisdiction proposed in section 2 of the Human
Life Bill. As one scholar has observed,
[T]here is language in Sheldon v. Sill ... suggesting that Congress
has absolute power ... to withhold district court jurisdiction be-

cause it has no obligation to create district courts in the first place.
But the holding .. . [is] far narrower. Sheldon involved the As-

signee Clause, which was a minor adjustment to the diversity jurisdiction designed to prevent people from manufacturing diversity by
assigning causes of action."
Similarly, in Palmore the congressional withdrawl of jurisdiction was nondiscriminatory. In 1970 Congress enacted the District
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act," vesting
jurisdiction over local matters in a new superior court. The superior court was specifically "established pursuant to Article I," not
article III. Unlike article III judges, the judges of the superior
court were not life-tenured and were subject to removal by a judi54.

49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).

55. Id. at 449.
56.

411 U.S. 389 (1973).

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 400-01, quoted in Uddo, supra note 7, at 1081.
D. CURRIE, supra note 40, at 15.
Pub. Law 91-538, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
D.C. Code Ann. § 11-1501 (1973).
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cial commission. 61 Palmore challenged these provisions after his
conviction in the superior court." The withdrawl of jurisdiction in
the Court Reform Act is readily distinguishable from that in the
Human Life Bill: article I specifically gives Congress authority to
legislate in all matters concerning the District; 3 the bill was motivated by court congestion in the regular article III courts in the
District;"' outside the District, cases of the same type as those
within the superior court's jurisdiction are handled by state courts,
with no reason to believe that those courts fail to give adequate
consideration to incidental federal questions arising within otherwise state cases.6 5 Because the Court Reform Act was so clearly
constitutional, it is of little support in exploring the outer limits of
congressional authority to limit jurisdiction.
Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co. 66 presents the strongest argument
that section 2 is constitutional. Professor Uddo has analyzed the
history that led up to Lauf; in a series of cases the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts had demonstrated an anti-union bias in
the face of Congress' attempts to protect the union movement. An
unsympathetic Supreme Court had entered
an era of harsh judicial intervention that came to be known as "government by injunction." . . . [T]here was little disagreement that
federal court intervention ... was inimical to the rise of unionism.
Predictably, pressure ... mounted for legislative relief...
The primary purpose of the (Norris-LaGuardia] Act was urgently
stated by the House Judiciary Committee: "The purpose of the bill
is to protect the rights of labor. . . ." This purpose would be
achieved by various means, but with emphasis upon the creation of
specific jurisdictional limitations and restrictions.
The effects of the Act were immediate and positive. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in Lauf v. E.G.
Shinner & Co. and soon thereafter began reinterpreting the use of
the antitrust laws in the labor relations field. Additionally, the lower
court abuses of the injunction procedure declined significantly. Congress' purpose had been achieved; labor was no longer subject to ju61.

Id. §§ 11-1502, 11-1521.

62. 411 U.S. at 393-94.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
64.
65.

411 U.S. at 392 n.2.
Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (noting that state courts deal with federal

constitutional claims; particularly in criminal prosecutions, on a daily basis, and are intrinsically no less competent than federal courts to decide such questions).
66. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
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dicial caprice. 67
Professor Uddo has called the Norris-LaGuardia Act "the exact paradigm for what [the Human Life Bill] tries to do."" At first
glance the analogy appears apt. Over a decade prior to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Supreme Court in Truax v.
Corrigan" had held that legislative efforts to outlaw "yellow dog"
contracts violated an employer's substantive due process right: "A
law which operates to make lawful such a wrong as is described in
plaintiffs' complaint [picketing and other union activity] deprives
the owner of the business and the premises of his property without
due process, and can not be held valid under the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' 70 The Norris-LaGuardia Act recognized the rights of
union members to organize. 1 In order to effectuate the policy of
the Act, Congress limited circumstances under which lower federal
courts could enjoin union activity. As in Truax the Court in Roe
based its unpopular decision on the unprincipled substantive due
process grounds.7 In enacting the Human Life Bill, Congress
would be securing the constitutional rights of the unborn, as it had
done for unions in Norris-LaGuardia by allowing states to protect
both entities.
As with Sheldon and Palmore the Court's decision in Lauf is
not so broad as proponents of jurisdiction-withdrawing statutes
contend. The Norris-LaGuardia Act did not eliminate all federal
court jurisdiction over labor disputes. Instead,
the Norris-LaGuardia Act requires a court to make findings similar
to those of an equity court before enjoining a labor dispute. The
court must find that substantial and irreparable injury will occur
without an injunction, that the balance of hardships favors the complainant, and that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law.78
Thus, as the authors of one constitutional law treatise argue, the
statute "sufficiently protects any arguable rights of an employer to
due process of law before the 'taking' of property. 7 4 The Human
67.
68.
at 407.
69.

A Wink From the Bench, supra note 13, at 411-14 (footnotes omitted).
Hearings, supra note 5, at 351. See also A Wink From the Bench, supra note 13,
257 U.S. 312 (1921).

70. Id. at 328.
71.
72.
73.

See 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976) protecting specific organizing activity.
A Wink From the Bench, supra note 13, at 407.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 22, at 45 n.6.

74. Id. at 45.
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Life Bill contains no similar protection of a woman's right to an
abortion.
More importantly, Lauf is not fully analogous to the Human
Life Bill because the employer did not have a constitutional right
impaired by the denial of federal court jurisdiction. By the time
Lauf was decided, the Supreme Court had all but expressly overruled cases that had invalidated the laws prohibiting "yellow dog"
contracts. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union Local No. 576 upheld a Wisconsin statute which in relevant part made peaceful
picketing lawful and prohibited state court injunctions against
such conduct.7 6 The Court rejected the employer's due process
claim. It distinguished Truax without overruling it. But the
Court's narrow reading of Truax effectively overruled Truax's
holding that an employer had a due process right to conduct business free from union activity. Said the Court,
Truax ... is not applicable. The statute there in question was
deemed to have been applied to legalize conduct which was not simply peaceful picketing, not "lawful persuasion or inducing," not "a
mere appeal to the sympathetic aid of would-be customers by a simple statement of the fact of the strike and a request to withhold
patronage." It consisted of libelous attacks and abusive epithets
against the employer and his friends; libelous and disparaging statements against the plaintiff's business; threats and intimidation directed against customers and employees ....
In the present case the only means authorized by the statute and in
fact resorted to by the unions have been peaceful and accompanied
by no unlawful act. It follows, that if the end sought is constitutional-if the unions may constitutionally induce Senn to agree to
refrain from exercising the right to work in his business with his own
hands, their acts were lawful.7
Thus, according to a number of commentators, the withdrawal of
jurisdiction upheld in Lauf was unquestionably lawful, because the
Norris-LaGuardia Act impaired no constitutional rights. 7 s Despite
wide criticism that the abortion liberty revives the discredited concept of substantive due process,7 9 recent Supreme Court decisions
have not eroded the principle of Roe v. Wade. In recent decisions
75. 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
76. 1931 Wis. Laws ch. 376; 1935 Wis. Laws ch. 551.
77. 301 U.S. at 479-80.
78. See, e.g, D. CURRIE, supra note 40; Meserve, supra note 42; Taylor, supra note 22.
79. A Wink From the Bench, supra note 13, at 407. See also J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE
CHOICE, ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 26-32 (1979).
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allowing withdrawal of public funds for elective abortions, the
Court has made clear that it is not retreating from Wade and its
progeny. 80
Further, Lauf did not even indirectly endorse a withdrawal of
jurisdiction as broad as that contemplated by section 2 of the
Human Life Bill. The district court found that there was no labor
dispute between the parties as required by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, and enjoined the union from seeking to coerce the employer to
discharge employees for refusing to join the union.81 After rejecting
the district court's finding, the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the district court:
Since the courts below were of opinion that a labor dispute, as defined by state and federal statutes, had not been shown, they did
not pass on the questions of the legality, under the Wisconsin law, of
the acts charged to have been done by the petitioners or the constitutionality of that law in legalizing any of such acts. As the case
must go back for further proceedings, we express no opinion upon
these questions.82
The Court did endorse the withdrawal of jurisdiction in the Norris-LaGuardia Act," but if withdrawal had been complete, remand
would not have been in order. Moreover, the cited language seems
to invite the district court to decide whether the defendant's unionizing activity violated the employer's due process rights and if
so, to remedy that violation. If the district court were not free to
remedy that violation, the Supreme Court would have been remanding the case for an advisory opinion. 4 The Court originally
granted certiorari to review whether the lower courts' decisions
conflicted with the Supreme Court's decision in Senn. 5 On remand
the district court would seemingly have to consider the extent to
which the employer's substantive due process right survived Senn.
Thus, while not entirely clear, the Court in Lauf seems to have
supported withdrawal of jurisdiction to enjoin union activity only
if the lower court found no violation of the employer's constitu80. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
81. 303 U.S. at 326.
82. Id. at 330-31 (emphasis added).
83. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 22. Sections 107(b)-(e) provided due process
protection to the employer.
84. The district court would obviously be without power to render an advisory opinion. See Correspondenceof the Justices (1793), reprintedin HART & WECHSLER, supra note
4, at 64-66. See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
85. 303 U.S. at 327.
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tional rights. In Lauf withdrawal of jurisdiction was not proper if
the plaintiff could show a violation of any due process right surviving Senn. 6
The Human Life Bill is far broader than the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as interpreted in Lauf. It withdraws lower federal court
jurisdiction of all abortion controversies, without any recognition
of the mother's constitutional right. It does so despite continued
adherence by the Court to its decision in Roe. 7
CONCLUSION
Professor Uddo testified before the Senate Subcommittee that
the constitutionality of section 2 of the Human Life Bill was "beyond debate." Elsewhere, he has argued that because its power
over lower federal court jurisdiction is plenary, Congress may alter
jurisdiction without regard to the impact withdrawal might have
on substantive constitutional rights.
At a minimum, this article demonstrates that the constitutionality of selective withdrawal of jurisdiction is the subject of active
debate, and that there is impressive authority for the view that
section 2 is unconstitutional. Not only is there an ongoing controversy, but there are reasons why the Bill is unconstitutional: plenary congressional power over a particular subject does not allow
Congress to impair other constitutional guarantees; the Human
Life Bill is intended to impair a constitutional right, no matter
how unpopular or suspect the heritage of the right; jurisdiction
cannot be manipulated when the motive and effect are impermissible. Finally, not even when it enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act
did Congress do what the Helms-Hyde Bill would do. Thus, judicial precedent cannot be found to support the Bill. At best, proponents of the Bill can cite dicta from cases where the withdrawal of
jurisdiction was unquestionably proper. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
did not impair an employer's substantive due process right to enter
into yellow dog contracts, because by the time Lauf was decided,
the Senn decision had all but finally interred the right. Addition86. The long judicial trail in Lauf ends in the district court on remand from the Supreme Court. E.G. Shinner & Co. v. Lauf, 36 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wisc. 1941). It is instructive
that the district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and ordered a new trial "in
an endeavor to establish a proper basis for the findings by this court, which are a necessary
prerequisite for the issuance of an injunction in a labor dispute, as defined by the NorrisLaGuardia Act." Id. at 713.
87. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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ally, the Act left open the federal forum to protect any remaining
constitutional rights asserted by the employer.
Section 2 of the Human Life Bill offers false hope to opponents of abortion. Federal district courts will take jurisdiction to
decide the constitutionality of section 2 of the Bill. That exercise
of jurisdiction is entirely appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because it is widely recognized that federal courts are the most appropriate fora in which to adjudicate federal rights.8 8 Inherent in
the determination of the validity of the jurisdictional withdrawal is
an analysis of the due process rights potentially affected by section
1 of the Bill. Thus, even if the Human Life Bill is enacted, the
validity of Congress' definition of "person" to include the unborn
will inevitably be litigated in the inferior federal courts.

88. See, e.g., D. CuRmRi, supra note 24, at 320-21.

